Author, Simon.
Published, April 27, 2009.
Our primary concern in this discussion is war. So, we will return to our faithful friend, the strategic bo
mber. Say that the strategic bomber from nation A, as described above, happened to know that, in bombing the military base, he would also hit a child-care centre. He is also aware that he would likely cause much pain to around 100 children in the centre, if not cause their deaths.
This is an example of the very problem that DDE tries to reconcile with Just War theory. The bomber wants to attack and destroy a legitimate military target, but in the process of doing so, will kill non-combatants. DDE is used to frame the situation in order to find a way for the strategic bomber to avoid violating the discrimination principle. The issue with DDE is that it is what Zupan calls “an excusing principle.” The Doctrine of Double Effect essentially states that we may harm combatants under certain conditions. This is how the principle is interpreted, but is not entirely true when applied to wartime situations, as I shall show.
Part 6, on Conditions and Considerations, is here.
1 Trackbacks/Pingbacks
- Pingback: Doctrine of Double Effect, Part 4: More DDE and Aquinas | Greyleads on April 27, 2009
Leave a comment