Author, Simon.
Published, May 13, 2009.

The conditions of the Doctrine of Double Effect take for granted that the negative consequences of our bomber’s actions are known by the bomber. Our bomber knows, then, that he is going to be killing civilians when he bombs the factory. Even though his principle aim was to destroy the munitions factory, he is still implicated in knowingly killing non-combatants. As it has been shown here, he is also implicated in intentionally killing non-combatants. It is clear that the bomber no longer acts with good intentions. Condition 1 of DDE, in which the agent must act with good intentions, is no longer satisfied. As I showed earlier, condition 4 is dubious and not satisfied in this scenario either. Therefore, two out of the four conditions (1 and 4) of DDE are not satisfied in what would be a fairly common scenario in modern war. It is also a very basic scenario; no unusual variables have been placed in the scenario.

This scenario could be used as a base model for just about any war situation, bar situations where fighters are forced to commit acts at literal or metaphorical gunpoint. As Michael Walzer says, “Only a man with a gun to his head is not responsible.” The Doctrine of Double effect is not plausible, because it does not satisfy the jus in bello principle of discrimination.