Author, Simon.
Published, June 18, 2008.
So, we have looked at how we might think about where justice originates; natural law, or social law. The philosophical problems that justice throws up are numerous, though. Conceiving of theories of justice
is much more complicated that simply ‘right and wrong’. Allow me to expand on a couple of very influential thinkers in the arena of Justice.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): English philosopher. Author of the highly influential book The Leviathan. Hobbes’ theory of justice is attractive in one sense, and awfully stark in another. Hobbes identifies injustice with breaking the law. According to Hobbes, just behaviour is simply conforming to societies laws. He goes on to surmise that law cannot exist without a ’sovereign’. For their to be genuine laws, there needs to be a sufficiently powerful sovereign to punish those who break the laws. So, without a sovereign, there is no law. Without laws, there can be no justice.
On an international, present day scale, it is very hard to conceive how a Hobbesian theory of justice could ever be applied. There is no global sovereign, and it is unlikely that there will be one in the foreseeable future. The United Nations is the closest thing we have to a global sovereign. It is next to impotent when it comes to enforcing laws, though.
John Rawls(1921-2002): American philosopher. Rawls is much less bare in his ideas of justice. Rawls’ theory is based on the idea that humans are reasonable creatures (although this
is obviously not always true) and will, when being reasonable, co-operate with each other when trying to come an agreement about whatever it is they are considering. His theory assumes a number of things, which he summarises as ‘The Original Position’; that participants in the negotiations are free and equal, that participants will be reasonable, that they may accept fair terms, and that they are rationally seeking to better their own position.
Also central to Rawls’ conception is what he has titled the “Veil of Ignorance”. This veil is one which doesn’t allow participants to know anything about any advantages or disadvantages they may have in relation to other participants. For example; I negotiate to play a game of tennis with Anna Kournikova. For it to be a fair agreement between myself and Anna, she has to be unaware that she is a far superior tennis player to me, and that she is also extremely attractive and, due to this, would probably gain much more support from any people watching the match. Her not knowing these things removes any bargaining power she might have when she is negotiating the agreement with me.
In Rawls own words:
“If we are reasonable, it is one our considered convictions that the fact that we occupy a particular social position, say, is not a good reason for us to accept, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favours those in that position.” (Fundamental Ideas)
Rawls’ model is supposed to be understood as a device for reaching justice; for reaching agreements that will result in just outcomes for all parties concerned.
Simon, you blog like a man possessed. Thanks for the comments on my blog. Nice to know someone else really got the Te Deum thing. Hans Zimmer + angry german soccer crowds = mayhem.
I’ve got a strange feeling that Peter Quinn is spam. Just a hunch.
Indeed, I think he was. He tried twice. “Hi. Long time reader…”; ah, yeah right.
Hmmm… I like that idea that morality is pre-cultural. I think culture plays a big part in some of the particularities of morality or justice, but only in the same way as ice-cream flavours only add to the overall enjoyment of ice-cream as a category. Cultures being the flavours and justice being the ice-cream. There are not exclusive. As soon as a culture or society construes an obvious injustice as being a cultural practice (and therefore acceptable), then it is time to question that particular practice. Just as the tall-poppy syndrome of Australian culture seems to have deep roots, it doesn’t make it right or not open to change. Cultures and societies evolve. Justice then ought to be defined by the general popular consensus (democracy baby!). Leaving it to a sovereign seems rather problematic. Mind you, of course there needs to be some type of sovereign to deliver justice. But just because one can deliver justice, it does not mean they have the monopoly over its definition.
Well, that was my little tangent. I mean, really, what is justice?
What you say is true, Adam. The circumstances surrounding Hobbes’ assertion that justice requires a sovereign are interesting; England, just post revolution I think? Things were a mess, and the monarchy was losing control of the country. I think this informed his conlcusions a fair bit.